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Abstract
Preferential treatment for politically influential sectors often has undesirable consequences
such as increasing pollution or ecosystem degradation. Private information on firm produc-
tivity constrains the government’s ability both to redistribute income and regulate public bad
production. Given political economy and information constraints, this article characterizes a
social-welfare maximizing policy. The optimal policy uses a single instrument to achieve both
goals, making income-support subsidies contingent upon reduction of bad outputs. Output
price uncertainty works to the advantage of the government, potentially eliminating some
firms’ information advantage.
JEL Classification: D82, H23, Q52
Key words: Mechanism design, environmental policy, political economy, countervailing
incentives
1 Introduction
It is a widely bemoaned fact that government subsidies often encourage the creation
of public “bads” (e.g., Green Scissors Campaign (2004) and Myers and Kent (2001)). This
type of policy is frequently encountered in environmental and natural resource sectors. Ex-
amples range from below-market timber concessions, to subsidized credit to fishing fleets,
to price supports for agricultural producers. These subsidies are especially pernicious since
the usual welfare loss from market distortions is compounded by the anti-Pigouvian eﬀect
of increasing negative externalities. Their continued existence in spite of high social costs is
a testament to the political influence of the beneficiaries.
To the palpable frustration of public interest groups, simply making policy-makers
aware of possibilities for simultaneously cutting budget deficits while reducing environmental
degradation is not suﬃcient to ensure remedial action. Policy recommendations that do not
satisfy implicit political economy constraints are likely to be non-starters.
In practice, when governments do try to reduce public damages caused by a polit-
ically influential sector, income subsidies are often completely “decoupled” from the action
an individual firm might take to reduce its share of undesirable outputs. Take United States’
agricultural policy, for example. Agricultural income support is popularly perceived as pro-
viding a safety net for economically vulnerable farmers. In this spirit, most direct payments
are countercyclical in nature, providing lump-sum transfers that vary inversely with output
prices. Income support is not generally contingent upon reducing environmental damage.
The largest agro-environmental program, the Conservation Reserve Program, is administered
independently as an auction in which farmers competitively bid for rental payments to take
environmentally-sensitive cropland out of production.
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At first glance, the approach of using two policy instruments to achieve the two
policy targets of income redistribution and public bad reduction seems economically eﬃcient.
Lump-sum transfers redistribute income in a non-distortionary way. Why use an auction for
the environmental component? In principle, a linear subsidy could eﬃciently allocate public
bad reductions. It is often reasonable, however, to suppose that individual firms know the
true opportunity cost of reducing damages better than the government. If public funds
are limited, mechanism design theory suggests that auctions can be an eﬀective means of
reducing the rents firms gain from their private information.
Upon further reflection it becomes evident that there should be a way of doing even
better. Suppose a firm’s opportunity cost of reducing public bads (for expository purposes
henceforth referred to as pollution emissions) depends upon its overall profitability. Then, a
firm’s participation in an auction reveals information that can be useful in determining how
much of an income subsidy that firm should receive. This observation suggests that under
asymmetric information, the two-instruments-for-two-targets approach may not perform as
well as switching metaphors and killing two birds with one stone: using one integrated
instrument to achieve both objectives.
Previous research has characterized optimal policies under asymmetric information
using the framework of Baron and Myerson (1982). These studies model a policy as a
system of contracts to which the government and the regulated sector commit. Private
information can give firms an incentive to misrepresent their true characteristics (referred to
as a firm’s type) by choosing a contract intended for another firm. In order to overcome these
incentives some firms must receive surplus payments. By making payments vary non-linearly
with observable actions, the government can impose costs to a firm for misrepresenting its
type. This result can make it suboptimal to “decouple” income redistribution payments
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from production decisions in a politically powerful sector (Lewis et al., 1989).
Private information frequently gives firms an incentive to misrepresent their type in
one direction. In an income support program for example, firms have an incentive to claim
that they are relatively less profitable in order to receive a larger subsidy. If the government
can introduce incentives that operate in the opposite direction, social welfare can be further
improved (Lewis and Sappington, 1989). This insight has led a number of authors to look for
means of introducing such “countervailing” incentives in environmental policy. If relatively
few firms have political clout, countervailing incentives may be created by allocating tradable
emissions permits first to preferred firms, then to the rest (Lewis and Sappington, 1995).
Alternatively, if the government can commit to a lottery over whether to monitor an input
or an output in a polluting industry, this contract introduces uncertainty into the firms’
incentives thereby reducing surplus payments and increasing social welfare (Bontems and
Bourgeon, 2000; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2001).
The present article builds on earlier work in a number of ways. In previous articles,
the government is in a relatively strong position vis a vis the regulated sector. Regulated
firms can be made worse oﬀ by the policy than they were without it, as long as they earn a
minimum level of profit. Here, I examine regulation of more powerful sectors where not only
must a profit target be met, but participation in the programmust be voluntary. Unlike Lewis
and Sappington (1995), I consider cases where the entire regulated sector has political clout,
so I cannot rely on unprivileged firms to generate countervailing incentives. Also, unlike
Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) or Khalil and Lawarrée (2001), the government does not need
to have the capacity to monitor more than one action. This last element is important in
many sectors. In agriculture, for example, it would be costly to monitor variable input and
output use since these tend to be commodities that can be bought or sold in many outlets.
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Moreover, some can be procured or consumed on the operation itself (e.g., fertilizer obtained
from manure or crops fed to livestock). A single quasi-fixed input like land cultivation, in
contrast, is relatively easy to observe.
Finally, unlike earlier research I examine the eﬀect of price variation. The literature
commonly assumes that prices are either non-stochastic or non-contractible. In reality of
course, neither is true. Not only do prices fluctuate, but contracts contingent on future prices
are common in both the private and public sectors. Firms’ welfare and incentives can depend
upon the realized price level. If so, the government can gain by forcing agents to commit to
a price-contingent contract before prices become known. The gains to the government occur
even if firms are risk neutral.
The two political constraints of a minimum profit level and voluntary participation
can of themselves create countervailing incentives. Private information works to the advan-
tage of firms and to the disadvantage of society both in terms of providing income support
and voluntarily reducing emissions. Consider the case of a pure income support program.
Due to the social cost of income transfers, the government would ideally give each firm the
minimum payment necessary to attain the income target. Firms have an underlying incentive
to under-state profitability in order to receive a higher subsidy. For a voluntary program
to reduce emissions, private information also gives firms a means of increasing payments
from the government. In this case, the higher a firm’s profitability, the higher its “return”
to polluting, and the greater the compensatory payment necessary to induce it to reduce
emissions. Consequently, firms have an incentive to over-state profit.
This intuition underlies the result that linking income support to emissions reduction
can outperform a combination of lump-sum transfers with either a cap-and-trade emissions
scheme or even a mechanism such as an emissions-reduction auction. If the two policy targets
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are linked to the same instrument a firm cannot simultaneously over-state and under-state
its type.
These countervailing incentives are not strong enough to cancel each other out com-
pletely. The degree of countervailing incentives depends on prices and contract timing. For
any given price level, one incentive always dominates. The eﬀect of the two political con-
straints varies with output price. If price is relatively high, the income support constraint
binds for fewer firms, but the voluntary participation constraint binds for more firms. If
price is low, the opposite is true.
If commitment takes place ex post (after output price is known), all firms know with
certainty whether they should over-state or under-state type. If commitment takes place
ex ante, the benefit from over-stating type should output price be high must be balanced
with the cost if it ends up being low. Thus, an ex ante contract serves to strengthen
countervailing incentives by reducing the expected benefit of misrepresenting type. In some
cases these countervailing incentives can be strong enough to eliminate entirely any incentive
to misrepresent type for a wide range of firm types.
In the next section, I present the formal model and assumptions, explicitly specifying
the political economy constraints and the government’s social welfare function. In Section
3, I establish a baseline by obtaining the allocation of emissions and payments that would
maximize social welfare if the government could observe firm type. In this full-information
case, standard policy approaches such as a cap-and-trade permit system can achieve the
social optimum. The remaining sections relax the full-information assumption. In Section
4, I examine the case where contract commitment takes place before the resolution of price
uncertainty. In Section 5, I examine the case where contract commitment occurs after
price is known. In Section 6, I examine the special case of decoupled contracts in which
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income support payments are not a function of an individual firm’s emissions. The model
makes it clear that the set of the government’s feasible options becomes gradually more
constrained as the analysis progresses from Section 3 to Section 6. As such, the ex ante
policy weakly dominates the ex post policy, which weakly dominates the decoupled policy.
It is only possible for the three types of policies to achieve the same results under restrictive
assumptions regarding factors exogenous to the model. If these conditions are not satisfied
the ranking of the three policies is strict, rather than weak. I oﬀer concluding remarks in
Section 7, and present proofs in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Risk-neutral firms are identical except for the productivity of emission permits. The




represents a firm’s type. Type is a measure of productivity
known only to the individual firm. The probability distribution of types for the entire sector
is common knowledge, however. The functions f (θ) and F (θ) denote the probability density
and cumulative distribution, where dF (θ) ≡ f (θ) dθ.
Firms use input x to create good q and emissions e. The government can monitor e,
but not x or q.1 The government regulates emissions by requiring a permit for each unit of
e. Each firm has the initial right to e permits, and must be compensated for relinquishing
any.
Input price is normalized to unity, and p denotes output price. Market profit earned
by a firm type θ at price p with e ∈ [0, e] permits is a thrice continuously diﬀerentiable
1Alternatively, the model could easily be adapted to cases in which the government can monitor a single
input or output, but not emissions.
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function π (p, e, θ):
π (p, e, θ) ≡ sup
x,q
{pq − x: x can produce q given e, θ} . (1)
Output price is random, having a Bernoulli distribution with outcomes “low” (p) with
probability ρ ∈ [0, 1], and “high” (ph) with probability 1 − ρ. Production takes place after
resolution of price uncertainty. Expected market profit (before p is known) is:
Π (e, θ) ≡ ρπ (p, e, θ) + [1− ρ]π (ph, e, θ) . (2)
The following regularity conditions restrict the production technology and distribution of
types:
R1. πe (p, e, θ) > 0;
R2. πee (p, e, θ) < 0;













> 0, for φ ∈ [0, 1] ;
b. [1+λ]
λ
g0 (θ) + F−φ
f





g0 (θ) ≤ 0, for φ ∈ [0, 1] , λ > 0.
The first condition states that there is always a positive opportunity cost to reducing
emissions. By R2 this cost increases as a firm reduces emissions. Condition R3 states that
profit is homothetic in θ. Consequently, θ behaves as a profit-neutral technical change
parameter (Chambers, 1988). Condition R4 indicates that a higher value of θ is desirable:
profit is always increasing in type. Combined with R1 it also ensures that the Spence-Mirrlees
condition is satisfied such that the foregone profit of higher types from a marginal reduction
7
in e is higher than that of lower types. Variations on the three parts of condition R5 are
commonly used in the literature to prevent pooling equilibria arising from purely technical
characteristics of the distribution of types and the production technology (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991).2
The government’s problem is to design a one-time allocation of transfers and emis-
sions reduction to each type of firm.3 Let t (p, θ) denote the transfer to firm type θ in price
state p. Expected transfers are:
T (θ) ≡ ρt (p, θ) + [1− ρ] t (ph, θ) . (3)
The number of emission permits allocated to a firm of type θ is e (θ). Due to the social costs
of moving the polluting input into and out of production the allocation e (θ) does not vary




e (θ) dF (θ) .
The amount of environmental damage caused by the sector is D (E), where D0 (E) > 0, and
D00 (E) > 0.
The optimal allocation maximizes the average (across firms) of expected (across
price states) net social benefits. To simplify the analysis, I assume that output demand
is perfectly elastic. Let λ > 0 denote the social cost of raising one dollar of public funds.
2For a detailed treatment of how to solve problems where R5 is violated consult Guesnerie and Laﬀont
(1984).
3Alternatively, this interaction can be viewed as a repeated game in which the government can commit
to not use information learned in one iteration in later repititions, thus avoiding the "ratchet eﬀect" (Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1993).
4In agriculture, for example, most environmental benefits accrue from taking a unit of land out of
production for an extended period of time (OECD, 1993).
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Average expected welfare, W˜ (·), from a given policy is then the sum of producer profit less
the cost of public funds and the damage caused by emissions:
W˜ (e (θ) , t (p, θ)) ≡
Z
Θ
{Π (e (θ) , θ)− λT (θ)−D(E)} dF (θ) . (4)
In designing an allocation of transfers and permits, the government must satisfy two
political economy constraints: i) all firms must attain a minimum profit threshold, m; and
ii) participation in the program must be voluntary. The income constraint is modeled as a
requirement that all firms earn at least minimum profit m in each price state:
π (p, e (θ) , θ) + t (p, θ) ≥ m, for all θ, p. (5)
To ensure the program is voluntary, firms must be compensated for the ex post cost of
emissions reductions. After price becomes known, no firm can have an incentive to cancel
the contract (i.e., decline both to reduce emissions and receive a payment). This participation
constraint is:
π (p, e (θ) , θ) + t (p, θ) ≥ π (p, e, θ) , for all θ, p. (6)
As illustrated in Figure 2. One can partition Θ into three consecutive intervals based
on the relative importance of the income and participation constraints. Define ΘL as the
interval of types for which the income constraint binds even if output price is high:
ΘL ≡ {θ : m > π (ph, e, θ)} . (7)




θ  θ  
( )θπ ,e,ph
π  











Figure 2: Partitioning Θ based on minimum income threshold.
price is low:
ΘM ≡ {θ : π (ph, e, θ) ≥ m} ∩ {θ : m ≥ π (p, e, θ)} . (8)
Define ΘH as the interval of types for the income constraint does not bind if price is low:
ΘH ≡ {θ : π (p, e, θ) > m} . (9)
Let θL and θH denote the lower and upper bounds of ΘM .
This partition of Θ simplifies treatment of the income and participation constraints.
For ΘL, if the income constraint is satisfied then the participation constraint is necessarily
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satisfied as well since:
π (ph, e (θ) , θ) + t (ph, θ) ≥ m > π (ph, e, θ) . (10)
For ΘH , satisfaction of the participation constraint implies that the income constraint is
satisfied since:
π (p, e (θ) , θ) + t (p, θ) ≥ π (p, e, θ) > m. (11)
Finally, for ΘM satisfaction of the income constraint implies the participation constraint is
satisfied when output price is low, and satisfaction of the participation constraint implies
that the income constraint is satisfied when output price is high:
π (p, e (θ) , θ) + t (p, θ) ≥ m > π (p, e, θ) , (12)
π (ph, e (θ) , θ) + t (ph, θ) ≥ π (ph, e, θ) > m. (13)
Denote surplus payments received by a firm in excess of the minimum necessary to
satisfy (5) and (6) by:
s (p, θ) ≡ π (p, e (θ) , θ) + t (p, θ)−max {m, π (p, e, θ)} . (14)
Constraints (5) and (6) can then be replaced by the following surplus constraint:
s (p, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, p. (15)
Ex ante surplus is:
S (θ) ≡ ρs (p, θ) + [1− ρ] s (ph, θ) . (16)
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It is convenient to redefine net welfare W˜ (e (θ) , t (p, θ)) as a functionW (e (θ) , s (p, θ))
of surplus rather than transfers. Using (4) and (14) to change the variables, W˜ (·) becomes:
W (e (θ) , s (p, θ)) ≡
Z
ΘL





[1 + λ]Π (e (θ) , θ)−D (E) (17)






{[1 + λ]Π (e (θ) , θ)−D (E)− λ [S (θ) + π (ph, e, θ)]} dF (θ) .
The government’s problem is to choose an allocation of e (θ) and s (p, θ) that maximizes
W (·). The diﬀerences between the four mechanisms (full information, ex ante, ex post,
and decoupled) are essentially diﬀerences in the set of feasible allocations from which the
government can choose. In the next section, I examine the full information mechanism.
3 Full Information Mechanism
Suppose type is observable and contractible. In this case, the regulator’s problem
is simply one of allocating a emissions and transfers payment to each type such that social
welfare is maximized subject to the political economy constraints summarized by (15). Let-
ting ψ (p, θ) ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier for (15), the government’s problem is to allocate
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e (θ) and s (p, θ) to maximize the full-information Lagrangian:








{ρψ (p, θ) s (p, θ) + [1− ρ]ψ (ph, θ) s (ph, θ)} dθ.
Proposition 1 summarizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 1 An interior solution for maximizing the full information Lagrangian (18)
satisfies the following conditions:
s (p, θ) = 0; (19)
[1 + λ]Πe (e (θ) , θ) = D
0 (E) ; (20)
e0 (θ) > 0. (21)
If the government can directly observe a firm’s type, no surplus payment is necessary
to induce it to tell the truth. Since surplus payments are socially costly, they are optimally
zero, hence Eq. (19).
Eq. (20) implicitly defines the optimal emissions allocation. Intuitively, allocation
of an additional emission permit to a firm of a given type has social benefits and costs.
The benefits arise from increasing the firm’s profit. The increase in profit has two welfare
implications. First, it increases firm welfare by Πe. Second, this increase in profit reduces
the social cost of satisfying the political constraints by λΠe. Increasing e also creates a social
cost by increasing environmental damage by D0 (E). At the optimum, the marginal benefits
equal the marginal cost for each firm. Since the right hand side of Eq. (20) is the same for
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all types, a second implication is that at the optimum the marginal profit earned from an
additional emission permit is equal for all firms.
Eq. (21) indicates that pooling is not optimal. The allocation of emissions permits
is optimally strictly increasing in type. This third condition follows directly from Eq. (20)
and the curvature of π and D.
Under full information, the two policy targets of redistributing income and obtaining
a socially optimal amount of pollution can be achieved by a traditional two-instrument set of
policies. For example, the eﬃcient emission allocation can be achieved by either a Pigouvian
tax or an emission trading scheme. These policies cause all firms to equate the marginal
profit of an emissions permit to the emissions tax or the market price of an permit. The
political economy constraints can then be satisfied by lump-sum transfers, where the size of
the transfer depends upon the firm’s type. By Eq. (21), a policy such as a common emissions
standard that applies to more than one type of firm is not optimal for a full information
mechanism. Moreover, since the government can replicate any ex post allocation with a state-
contingent ex ante allocation, timing has no influence on the full information mechanism.
4 Ex Ante Mechanism
Having established the optimality of conventional policy prescriptions under full in-
formation, I now relax this assumption. The government cannot force a firm to accept the
contract intended for it. Rather, a firm only accepts a contract if it maximizes the firm’s
expected welfare compared to all other available contracts.5 Hence, the government’s prob-
lem is more constrained than under full information. We shall see that with this additional
constraint, conventional policies such as cap-and-trade or a Pigouvian subsidy are no longer
5I do assume that if a firm is indiﬀerent between two contracts, it will choose the one intended for it by
the government.
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optimal. In general, it is optimal to link payments to emissions in a non-linear way. In
addition, cases may occur where it is optimal to enforce a common emissions standard for a
non-degenerate range of types.
For the ex ante revelation mechanism to be truthful, incentive compatibility requires





















Lemmas 1 and 2 state the constraints that incentive compatibility imposes on the
ex ante mechanism.
Lemma 1 A truthful ex ante mechanism requires the permit allocation to be monotonically
non-decreasing in type:
e0 (θ) ≥ 0. (23)
Lemma 2 A truthful ex post mechanism requires the change in expected surplus over type
to follow:




Πθ (e (θ) , θ) θ ∈ ΘL
Πθ (e (θ) , θ)− [1− ρ]πθ (ph, e, θ) θ ∈ ΘM
Πθ (e (θ) , θ)− Πθ (e, θ) θ ∈ ΘH
(24)
Note the shape of S (θ) as described in Eq. (24). For ΘL, expected surplus is always
increasing in type, whereas for ΘH expected surplus is always decreasing. For ΘM , expected
surplus may be increasing or decreasing, depending upon e (θ).
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 2, consider the situation faced by types
belonging to ΘL. For them, the income constraint (5) is always binding, regardless of output
price. Suppose firms were oﬀered the optimal full-information contract schedule. Firms
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could only increase utility by mimicking a lower type. To see this, recall that the first-best
contract assigns a payment to each type just suﬃcient to attain the minimum profit level.
A firm earns more profit from utilizing a given quantity of emission permits than any lower
type. A firm could take a contract intended for a lower type, receiving its permit allocation.
The size of the transfer would be enough to bring the lower type to the minimum profit level.
It would therefore bring a higher type above the minimum profit level. Thus, a higher type
could profitably mimic a lower type if the government oﬀered the higher type a contract
yielding zero expected surplus. A lower type could not improve its utility by mimicking a
higher type, however. By accepting a contract that leaves a higher type with net income m,
the lower type would receive less than m. Expected surplus payments are therefore required
to make it incentive compatible for higher types to pick the contract intended for them. The
change in expected surplus is increasing at the rate Πθ (e (θ) , θ).
Types belonging to ΘH face the opposite incentive. For them, only the participation
constraint (6) binds. The opportunity cost of relinquishing a permit increases with type.
Suppose the government tried to pay all firms exactly the opportunity cost. A low type
could profitably choose a contract for a higher type. It would obtain a transfer larger than
the opportunity cost of the lost permits. Expected surplus payments required to induce
truth-telling are therefore decreasing in type at the rate Πθ (e (θ) , θ)− Πθ (e, θ).
For types in ΘM the change in expected surplus is Πθ (e (θ) , θ)− [1− ρ]πθ (ph, e, θ).
The relative weight of the two incentives depends upon the probability distribution of output
prices. If price were always low (i.e., for ρ = 1), only the income constraint would bind and
they would face the same incentives as ΘL. If price were always high, only the participation
constraint would bind and they would face the same incentives as ΘH . For any given value
of ρ ∈ (0, 1), the incentive to over or under-state type depends on the emissions allocation
16
e (θ).
Define the allocation eˆ (θ) as that which makes S 0 (θ) = 0 for a given type in the
interior of ΘM :
eˆ (θ) ≡ {e : Πθ (e, θ) = [1− ρ]πθ (ph, e, θ) , θ ∈ (θL, θH)} . (25)
Note that (23), R1, R3 and R4 imply that if e (θ) < eˆ (θ) , then S0 (θ) < 0, and if e (θ) > eˆ (θ) ,
then S 0 (θ) > 0.
By imposing structure on the way type interacts with the production technology, R3
allows a precise characterization of the optimal contract mechanism. Specifically, this con-
dition makes eˆ (θ) constant for all θ. Under R3
Πθ (e, θ) = g
0 (θ) Π˜ (e) , (26)
where
Π˜ (e) ≡ ρπ˜ (p, e) + [1− ρ] π˜ (ph, e) . (27)
Consequently, (25) simplifies to:
eˆ (θ) = eˆ =
n
e : Π˜ (e) = [1− ρ] π˜ (ph, e)
o
. (28)
Since Lemma 1 requires that the permit allocation be non-decreasing in type, R3
implies that in the interval ΘM , S (θ) is roughly U-shaped, achieving its minimum for any
type(s) with eˆ permits (see Figure 3 for the case when e (θ) = e∗∗ (·)). If no types in ΘM
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emit eˆ, then S (θ) is monotonically increasing or decreasing as follows:
S0 (θ) > 0 if e (θL) > eˆ
S0 (θ) < 0 if e (θH) < eˆ.
(29)
As illustrated in Figure 3, there are three local minima for S (θ): each extreme and a central
type.
Let Γ (θ) be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint (24)
in Lemma 2. The government’s Lagrangian for the ex ante mechanism is the full information
Lagrangian (18) with the additional constraints implied by ex ante incentive compatibility:












Γ (θ)Πθ (e, θ) dθ
¾
,
subject to (23). The solution to this problem is characterized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An interior solution for maximizing the ex ante Lagrangian (30) satisfies
the following conditions:
[1 + λ]Πe (e (θ) , θ) = D
0 (E)− [F (θ)− Φ (θ)]
f (θ)
λΠeθ (e (θ) , θ) , where Φ (θ) ∈ [0, 1] ; (31)
There exists θsuch that S (θ) = 0. (32)
Eq. (31) indicates there is a distortion such that the marginal net benefit of an
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additional permit is not equated across all types. Unlike the full information case, since
right-hand-side of Eq. (31) varies across types, the linear emission price obtained by a
Pigouvian tax or emission trading scheme is not optimal here.
With asymmetric information, the selected contract is the only information the gov-
ernment can use to distinguish between diﬀerent types of firms. Thus, the permit allocation
must eﬀectively perform two roles: reduce pollution and reduce the cost of income support.
Eq. (31) reflects this trade-oﬀ. The marginal cost of increasing permits to a given firm
includes not only the environmental damage, but the net cost of additional payments made
to all other firms.
The general shape of the optimal contract cannot be determined a priori since it
depends upon exogenous factors such as p, ph, ρ, λ, and the specifications of f (·) and π (·).
As stated in (32), however, regardless of these factors at least one type always receives zero
expected surplus.
When the dominant incentive for all types is always to under-state or over-state
type, one of the extreme types receives zero expected surplus. In addition, there is another
possibility. Some firms have simultaneous incentives to over-state type for higher environ-
mental payments and under-state type for higher income subsidies and these incentives may
cancel out completely for a non-degenerate range of types in ΘM .
Since output price is unknown at the time contract commitment takes place, mis-
representing one’s type has an opportunity cost. Namely, declaring a type that maximizes
utility when price is high will be suboptimal if price turns out to be low. This benefit of
misrepresenting type in one state of nature can be exactly oﬀset by its cost in the other.
Consequently, for such types no surplus payments are required to induce truth telling.6
6Such pooling and elimination of expected surplus payments depends upon R3. Maggi and Rodríguez-
Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000) examine cases where this condition is violated.
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Any of the local minima depicted in Figure 3 is a candidate for a global minimum
for expected surplus. The result depends on the precise specification of the terms in the
incentive compatibility condition in Eq. (24).
After imposing R3 there are seven possible outcomes (summarized in Table 1) regarding
which minima are global. The seven possibilities are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure
3, the dominant incentive for all types is to mimic the lowest type. As a result, only the
lowest type receives zero expected surplus. The type (θ1) for which the slope of expected
surplus is zero is not a global minimum and therefore receives strictly positive expected
surplus. In Figure 4a, all interior types are indiﬀerent between mimicking either extreme
type. Note that this does not mean that the incentive to over-state type exactly countervails
the incentive to under-state type, leaving the firm without any incentive to misrepresent its
true type. Instead the firm might profitably imitate either a higher or lower type. However,
it receives the same expected surplus either way. Consequently, only the two extreme types
receive zero expected surplus. Figure 4b shows the opposite case of Figure 3. Here, only
the highest type receives zero expected surplus. In Figures 3, 4a, and 4b, countervailing
incentives are not strong enough to make pooling optimal.
In Figure 4c, for the pooling interval ΘˆM ≡ [θ1, θ2] the expected gain from over-
stating type if p = ph is exactly countervailed by the expected loss should the realized price
be p. These types require no expected surplus payments to state their true type. For types
to the left of ΘˆM the dominant incentive is to over-state type. The opposite is true for those
to the right. Figures 4d - f diﬀer from Figure 4c only in the respect that some types not
in ΘˆM are indiﬀerent between over-stating and under-stating type. Note again that these
producers might profitably over-state or under-state type, the expected gain being the same.
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Figure 3: Ex ante surplus can be increasing or decreasing depending on the level of emissions.
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Figure 4: Optimal ex ante contract schedules
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Table 1: Optimal Land Allocation
Value of Φ (θ) Types for which S (θ) = 0
1. Φ (θ) = 1, ∀ θ ∈ Θ θ
2. Φ (θ) = Φ1 ∈ (0, 1) , ∀ θ ∈ Θ θ and θ¯





Φ (θ) = 1, ∀ θ > θ2
Φ (θ) = Φˆ (θ) , ∀ θ ∈ ΘˆM
Φ (θ) = 0, ∀ θ < θ1





Φ (θ) = 0, ∀ θ > θ2
Φ (θ) = Φˆ (θ) , ∀ θ ∈ ΘˆM
Φ (θ) = Φ1 ∈ (0, 1) , ∀ θ < θ1





Φ (θ) = Φ2 ∈ (Φ1, 1) , ∀ θ > θ2
Φ (θ) = Φˆ (θ) , ∀ θ ∈ ΘˆM
Φ (θ) = Φ1 ∈ (0,Φ2) , ∀ θ < θ1





Φ (θ) = Φ1 ∈ (0, 1) , ∀ θ > θ2
Φ (θ) = Φˆ (θ) , ∀ θ ∈ ΘˆM
Φ (θ) = 1, ∀ θ < θ1
θ¯ and some θ ∈ ΘM
in emissions and expected payments for types belonging to ΘˆM .
In summary, the only diﬀerence between the government’s problem for the ex ante
mechanism and the full information mechanism is that for the ex ante mechanism the set of
feasible contract allocations is limited by the incentive compatibility constraint (22). This
small diﬀerence has profound implications for the characteristics of the optimal mechanisms
for the two information settings. With full information there is only one class of solutions:
emissions steadily increase with type, and no type receives any surplus payment. With the
ex ante contract, there are seven classes of solutions.7 Four of these exhibit pooling, such
that optimal emissions levels remain constant over a range of types. In each class some
types receive strictly positive expected surplus and at least one type receives zero expected
surplus. Unlike the full information mechanism the marginal profit from an additional unit
of emission is never equated across types for the optimal ex ante mechanism. As a result,
7There would be even more without R3.
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a policy instrument such as tradable permits is not optimal with asymmetric information.
If pooling is optimal, standards may be appropriate. Otherwise, the optimal mechanism is
characterized by a menu of contracts linking transfers to emissions in a non-linear manner.
5 Ex Post Mechanism
The ex post mechanism diﬀers from the ex ante mechanism in that firms commit to
contracts after output price is known. Permitting firms to contract ex post results in a more
restrictive incentive compatibility constraint than in the ex ante case.
For the ex post revelation mechanism to be truthful, incentive compatibility requires




















∈ Θ2, p. (33)
This requirement implies two constraints that a feasible ex post mechanism must satisfy,
summarized in Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 3 A truthful ex post mechanism requires the permit allocation to be monotonically
non-decreasing in type:
e0 (θ) ≥ 0. (34)
Lemma 4 A truthful ex post mechanism requires that the change in surplus over type follow:




πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)
πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (p, e, θ)
θ ∈ ΘL ∪ΘM
θ ∈ ΘH
(35)




πθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
πθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (ph, e, θ)
θ ∈ ΘL
θ ∈ ΘM ∪ΘH .
(36)
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Note that Lemma 3 is identical to its counterpart for the ex ante case, Lemma 1.
The fundamental diﬀerence between the two mechanisms lies in the Lemmas 2 and 4. Note
that any contract schedule that satisfies Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) necessarily satisfies Eq. (24),
but that the converse is not true. Since the ex post incentive compatibility constraints are
more restrictive than the ex ante constraints, it follows that the ex post mechanism cannot
achieve higher expected welfare than the ex ante mechanism.
To see the precise eﬀect of this stronger constraint, note the shape of surplus in each
state indicated by Lemma 4. This lemma implies that surplus may increase or decrease in
type depending on θ and p, as depicted in Figure 5. For ΘL, surplus is increasing, whereas
for ΘH surplus is decreasing. For ΘM , surplus is increasing if price is low and increasing if
price is high. Surplus in both states initially increases in θ, reaches a peak, then decreases. If
price is low, the peak occurs at θH . If price is high, the peak occurs at θL. As in the ex ante
case, the slope of the surplus payments curves depends upon which constraint is binding.
When the income constraint is binding surplus is increasing in type. The opposite is true
when the participation constraint binds.
From Figure 5 there are two local minima for surplus in each state. Ex post, either
the highest type, the lowest type, or both extreme types can potentially be global minima,
depending on the specific structure of π (p, e, θ) and f (θ).
Let γ (p, θ) denote the Lagrange multipliers for ex post incentive compatibility con-
straints (35) and (36). Since satisfaction of (35) and (36) implies satisfaction of the ex ante
incentive compatibility constraint (24), the ex post Lagrangian can be expressed as the ex
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Figure 5: Ex post surplus initially rises, then falls.
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ante Lagrangian (30) with the additional constraints:







πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− sθ (p, θ)
¤
















subject to (34). The solution to this problem is characterized below.
Proposition 3 An interior solution for maximizing the ex post Lagrangian (37) satisfies
the following conditions:






πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) +
[1−ρ][F (θ)−φh]
f(θ)
πeθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
i





e0 (θ) > 0. (40)
Like in the ex ante mechanism, there is a distortion in the optimal ex post emission
allocation from the optimal full information allocation. The marginal net benefit of an
additional emission is not equated across all types. Since the second term on the right-hand-
side of Eq. (38) varies across types, the linear emission price obtained by a Pigouvian tax or
emission trading scheme is not optimal here. Note, however, that the emission allocation for
the ex post mechanism is not generally equivalent to that of the optimal ex ante mechanism.
At least one extreme type receives zero surplus in each price state. For example, if
27
all types have a dominant incentive to under-state type when price is low, the lowest type
receives zero surplus (since it is unable to under-state its type further). If the reverse occurs
when price is high then the highest type receives zero surplus in that price state. In this
case all types receive strictly positive expected surplus. However, it may be possible that one
or both extreme types receives zero surplus in both states, and consequently receives zero
expected surplus.
Firms have simultaneous incentives to over-state type for higher environmental pay-
ments and under-state type for higher income subsidies. However, in each price state one
incentive typically dominates. On balance each firm has an incentive to misrepresent type
in one direction or the other. For no firm do the incentives cancel out. Consequently, as
shown in condition (39), all interior types require strictly positive surplus payments in each
price state in order to reveal their true type. Thus, expected surplus is strictly positive for
all these types.
Note from Figure 5 that either or both extremes can be global minima in each price
state. The result depends on the precise nature of the surplus equations of motion Eq. (35)
and Eq. (36). These in turn depend upon the emissions allocation.
The optimal permit allocation (and consequently the optimal schedule of surplus
payments) derived from (38) depends on the specifications of π and f . Without imposing
further structure on the model, there are nine possible outcomes regarding which types
receive zero surplus. Table 2 summarizes the diﬀerent possible values of the constants φ
and φh, and the corresponding types that receive zero surplus in each price state.
Regardless of which outcome is optimal, condition (40) indicates that absent a corner
solution, the optimal permit allocation is strictly increasing in type. In other words, unlike
the ex ante case uniform standards are never optimal.
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Table 2: Solutions to ex post mechanism
Type(s) for which:
Values of φ, φh s (p, θ) = 0 s (ph, θ) = 0 S (θ) = 0
1. φ = 1, φh = 1 θ θ θ
2. φ = 1, φh = 0 θ θ¯ none
3. φ = 1, φh ∈ (0, 1) θ θ, θ¯ θ
4. φ ∈ (0, 1) , φh = 1 θ, θ¯ θ θ
5. φ ∈ (0, 1) , φh = 0 θ, θ¯ θ¯ θ¯
6. φ ∈ (0, 1) , φh ∈ (0, 1) θ, θ¯ θ, θ¯ θ, θ¯
7. φ = 0, φh = 1 θ¯ θ none
8. φ = 0, φh = 0 θ¯ θ¯ θ¯
9. φ = 0, φh ∈ (0, 1) θ¯ θ, θ¯ θ¯
Comparing Eq. (31) with Eq. (38), the optimal emissions allocation for the ex post
mechanism is equivalent to the optimal allocation for ex ante mechanism only if φ = φh = Φ.
There are only three scenarios where this can happen, depending on factors exogenous to
the model: i) if the first case in Table 1 is optimal for the ex ante contract and the first case
in Table 2 is optimal for the ex post contract; ii) if the second case in Table 1 is optimal for
the ex ante contract and the sixth case in Table 2 is optimal for the ex post contract; and iii)
if the third case in Table 1 is optima for the ex ante contract and the eighth case in Table
2 is optimal for the ex post contract. Optimal expected transfers are ultimately the same
function of expected surplus and emission allocations (derived from Eq. (14)) for both the
ex ante and ex post contracts. Thus, if the emission allocation is the same for both types of
contracts, the expected transfers will be the same, and both will generate the same level of
expected welfare. Consequently for any of these three scenarios the ex post mechanism can
replicate the ex ante mechanism. Otherwise, however, it will be inferior.
Since the optimal ex post mechanism is more constrained than the optimal ex ante
mechanism, it cannot be superior. Generally, a permit allocation that satisfies the necessary
conditions for the ex post contract does not satisfy the necessary conditions for an optimal
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ex ante contract. Requiring an interval of types to reduce emissions by the same amount
is never optimal for an ex post mechanism, although it can be for an ex ante mechanism.
As a result, an ex post mechanism cannot reduce costs to the level of an ex ante contract
when such pooling is optimal. Moreover, for the ex ante mechanism at least one type always
receives zero expected surplus. It may also be the case that expected surplus payments can
be completely eliminated for an entire interval of types. For the ex post mechanism, however,
at most two types receive zero expected surplus, and in some cases all types receive strictly
positive expected surplus.
6 Decoupled Mechanism
In the previous sections we have seen that the set of feasible contract allocations
shrinks as we move from the full information mechanism to the ex ante mechanism, to the ex
post mechanism. Consequently, the welfare generated by each mechanism must be weakly
decreasing as we move from the former to the latter. The ex ante mechanism can never
achieve the welfare generated by the full information mechanism. A necessary condition
for the optimal full information allocation of emissions is that the marginal benefit of an
additional emission be equal for all types. This condition is not satisfied by the “best” ex
ante mechanism. Finally, although it is possible for the ex post mechanism to perform as well
as the ex ante mechanism, there are many cases where the emissions allocation of the best ex
post mechanism does not satisfy the necessary condition for an optimal ex post allocation.
In such cases the ex post mechanism is strictly inferior to the ex ante mechanism.
In this section, I further constrain the set of feasible contracts by limiting the gov-
ernment to “decoupled” mechanisms. For a decoupled mechanism, the administrator of the
income support program chooses the optimal uniform lump-sum transfer to all firms such
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that the income constraint is satisfied for all types. The agency responsible for environ-
mental quality selects the optimal allocation of emissions and payments subject only to the
constraint that the program be voluntary. The environmental policy can be an auction-
like mechanism that accounts for private information. However, income support payments
cannot vary with emissions.
Let tm (p) ≥ 0 and te (p, θ) ≥ 0 be the lump-sum transfers and emissions payments,
respectively, where
t (p, θ) = te (p, θ) + tm (p) . (41)
The income constraint is exactly the same as before in (5):
tm (p) + te (p, θ) + π (p, e (θ) , θ) ≥ m for all θ, p. (42)
Unlike the previous problems, for the decoupled mechanism, income support pay-
ments do not count towards satisfaction of the participation constraint since they are received
regardless of emission reductions. To be voluntary, the emission program must satisfy the
constraint:
te (p, θ) + π (p, e (θ) , θ) ≥ π (p, e¯, θ) for all θ, p. (43)
Note satisfaction of this constraint implies that the participation constraint for the combined
programs, (6), is satisfied, but the converse is not true.
Define surplus from the emissions program alone as:
se (p, θ) ≡ t (p, θ)− tm (p) + π (p, e (θ) , θ)− π (p, e¯, θ) . (44)
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The income and participation constraints for the decoupled problem can be expressed as:
tm (p) + se (p, θ) + π (p, e¯, θ)−m ≥ 0; and (45)
se (p, θ) ≥ 0. (46)
Surplus from the emissions program and lump-sum transfers are related to total surplus (14)
through the following identity:
s (p, θ) ≡ se (p, θ) + tm (p) + π (p, e¯, θ)−max {m, π (p, e¯, θ)} . (47)
As in the ex post case, incentive compatibility requires that stating the true type
satisfy expression (33) for all firms. Therefore, the emission allocation and total surplus must
still satisfy the conditions stated in Lemmas 3 and 4. In addition, the payment schedule for
emission reduction must be incentive compatible. Lemma 5 describes the eﬀect of incentive
compatibility on se (p, θ).
Lemma 5 A truthful decoupled mechanism requires that the change in se (p, θ) over type
follow:
seθ (p, θ) = πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (p, e, θ) , θ ∈ Θ. (48)
Eq. (48) implies that surplus from the emissions program is decreasing over type. How-
ever, total income from the emissions program (π (p, e¯, θ) + se (p, θ)) is increasing by type.
Therefore, the income constraint is satisfied for all types if it is suﬃcient to bring the lowest
type to the minimum income level. Consequently, the income constraint (45) can be defined
more specifically as:
tm (p) + π (p, e¯, θ) + se (p, θ)−m ≥ 0. (49)
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There is no loss in generality in redefining the government’s problem in terms of se (p, θ)
and tm (p), rather than s (p, θ) .The government’s problem for the decoupled program is then
expressed as choosing a lump-sum transfer tm (p) and allocations e (θ) and se (p, θ) that
maximize expected social welfare subject to income constraints (5) and (49), participation
constraints (6) and (46), incentive constraints (35), (36), (48), and (34). Note that satisfac-
tion of (49) implies satisfaction of (5). Satisfaction of the decoupled participation constraint
(46) implies that (6) is satisfied, but not vice versa. Similarly satisfaction of (48) implies
that both (35) and (36) are satisfied, but the converse is not true. Letting ψe (p, θ), ψm (p),
and γe (p, θ) denote the respective Lagrange multipliers for (46), (49), and (48), the La-
grangian for the decoupled problem is then the ex post Lagrangian (37) with the additional
constraints:
LD (e, se, tm, µ, ψm, ψe, γe) = LXP (e, s, µ, ψ, γ) + (50)
+ρψm (p) [t
m (p) + s
e (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ)−m]







πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (p, e, θ)− seθ (p, θ)
¤
+ [1− ρ] γe (ph, θ)
£
πθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (ph, e, θ)− seθ (ph, θ)
¤
+ρψe (p, θ) s
e (p, θ) + [1− ρ]ψe (ph, θ) se (ph, θ)
ª
dθ,
subject to (34). The solution to this problem is characterized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 An interior solution for maximizing the decoupled Lagrangian (50) satisfies
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the following conditions:
s (p, θ) tm (p) = 0; (51)




> 0 for all θ > θ; (52)
s (p, θ) > 0 for all θ¯ > θ > θ; (53)
[1 + λ]Πe (e (θ) , θ) = D
0 (E)− λF (θ)
f (θ)
Πeθ (e (θ) , θ) ; (54)
e0 (θ) > 0. (55)
Eq. (51) states that the lowest type receives positive surplus only if the lump-sum
transfer is zero, and receives zero surplus if the lump-sum transfer is positive. There are two
possible cases. The emissions program alone may be suﬃcient to bring the income of the
lowest type at or above m. Then the lowest type receives weakly positive total surplus and
no lump-sum transfer is necessary. Alternatively, the emissions program alone leaves the
income of the lowest type below m. Then the optimal lump-sum transfer brings the lowest
type to exactly m, leaving it with no surplus.
Expressions (52) and (53) draw out the implications of these two cases for all other




= 0 at the
optimum. If there is no lump-sum transfer, the highest type receives total income π (p, e, θ)
and zero total surplus. If, however, there is a lump-sum transfer, the highest type earns
π (p, e, θ)+ tm (p), and consequently receives positive total surplus. In either case, all interior
types receive strictly positive total surplus.
Expressions (54) and (55) describe the optimal decoupled emissions allocation. Since
the right hand side of Eq. (54) varies with type a Pigouvian tax is not optimal. Nor is an
emission standard since emissions are optimally strictly increasing by type. Comparing Eq.
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(54) to Eq. (38) from the ex post problem, the emissions allocation is the same for both the
decoupled and the linked programs only for the eighth case in Table 2.
To summarize, if the exogenous factors are such that any solution other than the
eighth in Table 2 applies, then the best emissions allocation for the decoupled program
does not satisfy the necessary conditions for the less-constrained combined ex post program.
Social welfare is then lower with the decoupled program than with the ex post program.
If, however, the eighth solution in Table 2 does apply, then the emissions allocation for the
two types of programs will be identical. In that case, only the highest type receives zero
total surplus. Since the emissions allocations are identical, the equations of motion for total
surplus, Eq.(35) and Eq.(36) are identical for the two types of program. Consequently, total
surplus in each price state received by each firm is identical, and by Eq.(14) total transfers
are identical. In other words, there is no diﬀerence between the two programs.
7 Conclusion
Under full information, standard policy instruments can optimally reduce the pro-
duction of public bads while satisfying political economy constraints. A cap-and-trade
scheme, for example, ensures that the socially optimal amount of emissions are produced
at the least possible cost to society. Income distribution targets can then be achieved by
lump-sum transfers. If firm productivity is private information, however, it is no longer
optimal to use two policy instruments to achieve the two policy targets.
The loss in welfare caused by information asymmetry relative to the full information
case can be ameliorated if countervailing incentives are present. For the problem of reducing
public bads in politically sensitive sectors potential countervailing incentives may exist. For
a voluntary environmental policy, high productivity can be correlated with high losses in
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profit from reduced emissions. Firms with higher productivity then require higher compen-
satory payments for pollution reduction. As a result, firms have an incentive to over-state
productivity. For an income support program, however, high productivity implies a lower
need for subsidies. Therefore, firms have an incentive to under-state productivity for income
support.
With asymmetric information, employing a decoupled program with two policy in-
struments generally results in lower social welfare than using one instrument to attain both
income distribution and environmental quality goals. A program linking income transfers to
environmental performance helps overcome information problems since firms cannot simulta-
neously over and under-state productivity. For any given level of output prices, the optimal
linked program cannot be implemented by tradable permits, an emissions fee, or uniform
emissions standards. Instead, payments must vary non-linearly with pollution reduction.
Social welfare actually increases if output prices fluctuate randomly. If firms are
obliged to commit to an emissions reduction contract before output price is known, this
uncertainty reduces the incentive to misrepresent their true productivity. If a firm over-
states productivity, this may help it if output price is high, but hurt it if the price turns
out to be low. Unlike contracts signed when price is known, this uncertainty can completely
eliminate the advantage of private information for an entire range of firms. For this case, an
inflexible standard is optimal for those firms.
This analysis implies that information can have a negative social value. Specifically,
suppose the government enacted an optimal policy under conditions of price uncertainty.
Any research done to give firms reliable information about future prices before contract
commitment would eﬀectively transform the optimal mechanism from an ex ante one to an
ex post one. This research would be beneficial to the firms since it would allow them to reap
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more benefits from their private information regarding profitability. However, the net social
welfare eﬀect would be negative since the ex post mechanism is generally inferior to the ex
ante mechanism.
Although the discussion in this article focused on a case where pollution can be
monitored and regulated with emissions permits, the results can be easily extended to other
cases. In cases where public damages are a function of observable inputs or outputs these
may be regulated in a similar way. For agriculture, for example, the government may pay
farmers to take land out of production. Fishermen may be oﬀered payments to reduce their
catch or to reduce their fishing capacity. Timber companies may be paid to reduce their
output or reduce the acres harvested. For influential sectors such as these, the mechanism
described in this paper is likely to be politically feasible since public damages are reduced
voluntarily and firms are able to maintain previous levels of preferential treatment.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The necessary conditions obtained by maximizing (18) with
respect to s (p, θ) are:
ψ (p, θ)− f (θ) = 0; (56)
ψ (p, θ) ≥ 0; (57)
s (p, θ) ≥ 0; (58)
ψ (p, θ) s (p, θ) = 0. (59)
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Eq. (56) implies that ψ (p, θ) > 0. Eq. (19) then follows directly from Eq. (59). The
necessary conditions obtained by maximizing (18) with respect to e (θ) are:
We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ) ≤ 0;
e (θ) [We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ)] = 0.
Since s (p, θ) = 0, these conditions simplify to Eq. (20) for an interior solution. Expression
(21) follows by diﬀerentiating Eq. (20) with respect to e (θ) and θ and employing the
regularity conditions.
Proof of Lemma 1. A necessary condition for satisfaction of (22) is:
Πe (e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ) + Tθ (θ) = 0, ∀ θ. (60)
At the optimum, the second-order condition is:
Πee (e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ)2 +Πe (e (θ) , θ) e00 (θ) + Tθθ (θ) ≤ 0,∀ θ. (61)
Diﬀerentiating Eq. (60) yields:
Πee (e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ)2 +Πe (p, e (θ) , θ) e00 (θ) + Tθθ (θ) +Πeθ (a (θ) , θ) e0 (θ) = 0 (62)
Consequently, the second order condition simplifies to:
−Πeθ (a (θ) , θ) e0 (θ) ≤ 0. (63)
Expression (22) then follows directly from the regularity conditions.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Eq. (24) follows from diﬀerentiation of Eq. (16) for each price state
and interval, and using Eq. (60).
Proof of Proposition 2. I follow the standard practice of solving a relaxed version of the
government’s problem in which the monotonicity condition (23) is not explicitly included in
the Lagrangian. I then check to ensure that the solution to this relaxed problem satisfies this
condition. The problem is further simplified by realizing that for the ex ante mechanism there
is no loss in generality in replacing surplus constraint (15) with expected surplus constraint:8
S (θ) ≥ 0. (64)
Let Ψ (θ) be the Lagrange multiplier for (64). Using the expected surplus constraint, the
Lagrangian is:
W (e (θ) , S (θ)) +
Z
Θ
µ (θ) [e− e (θ)] dθ + λ
Z
Θ




Γ (θ) [Πθ (e (θ) , θ)− S 0 (θ)] dθ −
Z
ΘM
(1− ρ)Γ (θ) πθ (ph, e, θ) dθ −
Z
ΘH
Γ (θ)Πθ (e, θ) dθ
¸
,
with control variables e (θ) and S (θ) .
Integration of (65) by parts yields:
W (e (θ) , s (p, θ)) + λ
Z
Θ




µ (θ) [e− e (θ)] dθ + λ
£









8Since firms are risk neutral they are indiﬀerent between contracts that yield the same expected surplus
with diﬀerent combinations of ex post surplus. Thus, any contract with non-negative expected surplus can
be implemented with payouts such that ex post surplus is weakly positive in each state.
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By point-wise optimization, the necessary conditions for e (θ) are:
We (e (θ) , θ) +
Γ (θ)
f (θ)




e (θ) ≥ 0 (68)
e (θ)
∙
We (e (θ) , θ) +
Γ (θ)
f (θ)





e¯− e (θ) ≥ 0 (70)
µ (θ) ≥ 0 (71)
µ (θ) [e¯− e (θ)] = 0 (72)
Necessary conditions for S (θ) are:
Γ0 (θ) +Ψ (θ)− f (θ) = 0 (73)
Ψ (θ) ≥ 0 (74)
S (θ) ≥ 0 (75)
Ψ (θ)S (θ) = 0 (76)
Eq. (73) indicates that Ψ (θ) may not be strictly positive for all types. Consequently some
types may receive positive expected surplus. Necessary conditions for the optimal endpoints
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of S (θ) are:
−Γ (θ) ≥ 0 (77)
S (θ) ≥ 0 (78)




















Denote the (possibly empty) subinterval of types within ΘM that use eˆ as ΘˆM , with lower
and upper bounds θ1 and θ2. Since θ, θ¯, and ΘˆM are all local minima of S (θ), if it is optimal
for any type(s) to receive zero expected surplus it will be one of these.
First, note that it is optimal for at least one of these minima to receive zero expected
surplus. To see this, consider the contrary. Integration of (73) implies:
Z θ
θ
Γ0 (θ) dθ =
Z θ
θ
f (θ) dθ −
Z θ
θ





− Γ (θ) = 1−
Z θ
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ (84)
If all types strictly positive expected surplus, then Ψ (θ) = 0. In addition, (79) and (82)




= 0. Consequently, (84) implies 0 = 1, clearly a contradiction.









Ψ (θ) dθ = Γ (θ)−
Z θ
θ






Ψ (z) dz − Γ (θ) . (86)
Integration of (73) for an interior type implies:
Z θ
θ
Γ0 (θ) dθ =
Z θ
θ
f (θ) dθ −
Z θ
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ (87)
Γ (θ) = F (θ) + Γ (θ)−
Z θ
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ (88)
Γ (θ) = F (θ)− Φ (θ) . (89)
The solution of the problem can take one of several qualitatively diﬀerent forms depending
upon which of the local minima of S (θ) are global minima. Which case applies cannot be
determined a priori since it depends in turn upon the particular specifications of π (p, e, θ)
and f (θ).
If only the highest type receives zero surplus then S (θ) > 0 and Γ (θ) = 0 by (79) and









and Φ (θ) = 1 for all types.
A third alternative is that only both extreme types receive zero surplus. Define













[1− ρ]πθ (ph, e, θ) dθ −
Z
ΘH
Πθ (e, θ) dθ,







f (θ)Πee (e∗, θ) + Γ (θ)Πeeθ (e∗∗, θ)
> 0, (91)
due to the regularity conditions. Therefore, ∆ (·) is decreasing in Φ (θ). For both extremes
to receive zero expected surplus it must be the case that









Note that since expected surplus is positive for all interior types,
R θ
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ = 0 for all
types. Consequently, Φˆ (θ) = −Γ (θ) for all types.
If a central interval of types θ ∈ ΘˆM receives zero expected surplus, then integration of
(73) from θ to θ1 implies:
Z θ1
θ
Γ0 (θ) dθ =
Z θ1
θ
f (θ) dθ −
Z θ1
θ





− Γ (θ) = F (θ1)−
Z θ1
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ (94)
Rearranging (94):
Γ (θ1)− F (θ1) +
Z θ1
θ
Ψ (θ) dθ = Γ (θ)−
Z θ
θ





Ψ (z) dz − Γ (θ) . (96)
If S (θ) > 0, then Γ (θ) and Φ1 (θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [θ, θ1] .
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Alternatively, it may be the case that both θ and all θ ∈ ΘˆM receive zero surplus. Define:





∗∗ (θ,Γ (θ)) , θ) dθ −
Z θ1
θL
[1− ρ]πθ (ph, e, θ) dθ.
In this case, ∆1 (Γ (θ)) = 0 and








, for θ ∈ [θ, θ1] .
Similarly, let
















. It also may be the case that θ¯
and all θ ∈ ΘˆM receive zero surplus.
Define:









∗∗ (θ,Γ (θ)) , θ) dθ −
Z θH
θ2




Πθ (e, θ) dθ.
In this case ∆1 (Γ (θ)) = 0 and













To verify that for an interior solution e∗∗ satisfies the monotonicity condition (23), diﬀeren-
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The monotonicity condition is satisfied due to the regularity conditions.
Proof of Lemma 3. For an interior solution, a necessary condition for satisfaction of
(33) is:
πe (p, e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ) + tθ (p, θ) = 0. (101)
At the optimum, the second order condition is:
πee (p, e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ)2 + πe (p, e (θ) , θ) e00 (θ) + tθθ (p, θ) ≤ 0, ∀ θ, p. (102)
Diﬀerentiating (101) implies:
πee (p, e (θ) , θ) e
0 (θ)2 + πe (p, e (θ) , θ) e00 (θ) + tθθ (p, θ) + πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) e0 (θ) = 0 (103)
Using (103), the second order condition simplifies to:
−πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) e0 (θ) ≤ 0,∀ θ, p. (104)
The result then follows from the regularity conditions.
Proof of Lemma 4. The result follows from diﬀerentiation of Eq. (14) in each price state
and interval and using Eq. (101).
Proof of Proposition 3. I follow the standard practice of solving a relaxed version of
(37) that ignores monotonicity condition (34). I then verify that the solution to the relaxed
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problem satisfies (34).
First, I remove the redundant expected surplus motion constraint (24) and its mul-
tiplier Γ (θ) since its satisfaction is implied by the ex post surplus motion constraints (35)
and (36). The resulting Lagrangian is:
W (e (θ) , S (θ)) +
Z
Θ







πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− sθ (p, θ)
¤
















with control variables e (θ) and s (p, θ).
Integration of (105) by parts yields:











[γθ (ph, θ) + ψ (ph, θ)] s (ph, θ) + γ (ph, θ)πθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
¤ª
dθ








{ργ (p, θ) πθ (p, e, θ) + [1− ρ] γ (ph, θ)πθ (ph, e, θ)} dθ
+ρ
£




















By point-wise optimization, necessary conditions for e (θ) are:
We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ) (107)
+λ
£
ργ (p, θ)πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) + [1− ρ] γ (ph, θ) πeθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
¤
≤ 0
e (θ) ≥ 0 (108)
e (θ) {We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ)
+λ
£
ργ (p, θ) πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) + [1− ρ] γ (ph, θ) πeθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
¤ª
= 0 (109)
e¯− e (θ) ≥ 0 (110)
µ (θ) ≥ 0 (111)
µ (θ) [e¯− e (θ)] = 0. (112)
Necessary conditions for s (p, θ) are:
γθ (p, θ) + ψ (p, θ)− f (θ) = 0 (113)
ψ (p, θ) ≥ 0 (114)
s (p, θ) ≥ 0 (115)
ψ (p, θ) s (p, θ) = 0 (116)
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γ (p, θ) ≤ 0 (117)
s (p, θ) ≥ 0 (118)




















Integration of (113) implies:
Z θ
θ
γθ (p, z) dz =
Z θ
θ
f (z) dz −
Z θ
θ








ψ (p, z) dz − 1 = γ (p, θ)−
Z θ
θ
ψ (p, z) dz. (124)
Define:
φ (p, θ) ≡
Z θ
θ
ψ (p, z) dz − γ (p, θ) . (125)
By construction, ψ (p, θ) ≥ 0. Therefore, (117), (120), and (124) imply φ (p, θ) ∈ [0, 1].
Integration of (113) for an interior type yields:
Z θ
θ
γθ (p, z) dz =
Z θ
θ
f (z) dz −
Z θ
θ
ψ (p, z) dz (126)
γ (p, θ)− γ (p, θ) = F (θ)−
Z θ
θ
ψ (p, z) dz (127)
γ (p, θ) = F (θ)− φ (p, θ) . (128)
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Note from Figure 5, that if it is optimal for any type in a given price state to
receive zero surplus it will be one of the endpoints θ or θ¯. For all other types ψ (p, θ) = 0.
Next, observe that if one endpoint optimally receives strictly positive surplus, the other
must optimally receive zero surplus. To see this, consider the contrary. If both extremes
receive strictly positive surplus, then ψ (p, θ) = 0 for all types. In addition, (119) and (122)










> 0, the left hand side of Eq. (124) is−1 for all types, therefore φ (p, θ) = 1
and γ (p, θ) = F (θ)− 1. If s (p, θ) > 0, the right hand side of Eq. (124) is zero for all types,
therefore γ (p, θ) = F (θ).
Let δ (γ (p, θ) , γ (ph, θ)) and δh (γ (p, θ) , γ (ph, θ)) denote the diﬀerences in surplus
between the extreme types in each state:









∗, θ) dθ −
Z θ¯
θH
πθ (p, e, θ) dθ (129)









∗, θ) dθ −
Z θ¯
θL
πθ (ph, e, θ) dθ, (130)
where e∗ ≡ e∗ (γ (p, θ) , γ (ph, θ)) is the quantity of land that satisfies (144)-(149).
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−ρπeθ (p, e∗, θ)
Wee
λ
+ ργ (p, θ) πeeθ (p, e∗, θ) + (1− ρ) γ (ph, θ)πeeθ (ph, e∗, θ)




− (1− ρ) πeθ (ph, e∗, θ)
Wee
λ
+ ργ (p, θ) πeeθ (p, e∗, θ) + (1− ρ) γ (ph, θ)πeeθ (ph, e∗, θ)
> 0, (132)
due to the regularity conditions. Therefore, since γ (·) is decreasing in φ (p, θ), both δ and
δh are decreasing in φ (p, θ).
Finally, denote the values of φ (p, θ) that give both extreme types zero surplus as:


















Since all interior types receive positive surplus,
R θ
θ
ψ (p, z) dz = 0 for all θ < θ¯. Consequently,
referring to Eq. (125), φˆ (p, θ) must equal −γ (p, θ) for all types.
The values of φ (p, θ) that satisfy the necessary conditions for an optimum can therefore
be characterized as follows:




0 if δ (F (θ) , γ (ph, θ)) ≤ 0
φˆ (p, θ)
if δ (F (θ)− 1, γ (ph, θ)) < 0,
and 0 < δ (F (θ) , γ (ph, θ))







0 if δh (γ (p, θ) , F (θ)) ≤ 0
φˆ (ph)
if δh (γ (p, θ) , F (θ)− 1) < 0,
and 0 < δh (γ (p, θ) , F (θ))
1 if 0 ≤ δh (γ (p, θ) , F (θ)− 1) .
(136)
It remains to verify that the solutions satisfy the monotonicity condition (34). For an










































Here, a superscript  or h indicates that the function is evaluated at p = p or ph. The
regularity conditions ensure that the right hand side of this equation is strictly positive,
hence the monotonicity condition is satisfied for all of the above cases. Consequently, using
(165) one can substitute F (θ) − φ (p, θ) for γ (ph, θ) in (144) and (146), thus obtaining Eq.
(38). Expression (39) follows directly from the surplus constraint (15) and the equations of
motion in Lemma 4. Expression (40) follows from the fact that (137) is strictly positive for
an interior solution.
Proof of Lemma 5: The result follows from diﬀerentiation of Eq. (44) in each price state,
and using Eq. (101).
Proof of Proposition 4: I follow the standard practice of solving a relaxed version of
(50) that ignores monotonicity condition (34). I then verify that the solution to the relaxed
problem satisfies (34).
I remove the redundant surplus constraint (15) with its multiplier ψ (p, θ) since its
satisfaction is implied by (45) and (46). I also remove total surplus motion constraints (35)
and (36) and their multipliers γ (ph, θ) since their satisfaction is implied by the emission
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surplus constraint (48) and the fact that the income-support transfer is made in a lump-sum
fashion. The resulting Lagrangian is:
W (e (θ) , S (θ)) +
Z
Θ
µ (θ) [e− e (θ)] dθ
+ρψm (p) [t
m (p) + s
e (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ)−m] (138)







πθ (p, e (θ) , θ)− πθ (p, e, θ)− seθ (p, θ)
¤
+ [1− ρ] γe (ph, θ)
£







ρψe (p, θ) s





with control variables e (θ), se (p, θ), and tm (p).
Integration of (138) by parts yields:
W (e (θ) , S (θ)) +
Z
Θ
µ (θ) [e− e (θ)] dθ +
+ρψm (p) [t
m (p) + s
e (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ)−m]







[γeθ (p, θ) + ψ
e (p, θ)] s
e (p, θ) + γ




[γeθ (ph, θ) + ψ
e (ph, θ)] s
e (ph, θ) + γ






{ρψm (p, θ) [tm (p) + se (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ)−m]

























Expressions (51), (52), and (53) follow directly from (46), (47), and the first order
conditions for the optimal lump-sum transfer. Necessary conditions for tm (p) are:
λ− ψm (p) ≥ 0 (140)
ψm (p) ≥ 0 (141)
tm (p) ≥ 0 (142)
ψm (p, θ) [tm (p) + se (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ)−m] = 0. (143)
These equations state that if a strictly positive lump-sum transfer is optimal, then (140)
will hold as an equality. Intuitively, when a lump-sum transfer is necessary, relaxing the
income constraint by $1 saves the social cost of raising $1 of revenue per firm, i.e., λ. If
ψm (p, θ) = λ, then Eq. (143) implies that tm (p) will be the minimum necessary to ensure
that type θ earns m. Since transfers are costly, they will be as small as possible. From (47)
if tm (p) + se (p, θ) + π (p, e, θ) = m then se (p, θ) = 0.
Expressions (54) and (55) follow from the regularity conditions and the first order
conditions for e (θ) and se (p, θ). By point-wise optimization, necessary conditions for e (θ)
are:
We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ) (144)
+λ
£
ργe (p, θ)πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) + [1− ρ] γe (ph, θ) πeθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
¤
≤ 0
e (θ) ≥ 0 (145)
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e (θ) {We (e (θ) , S (θ))− µ (θ)
+λ
£
ργe (p, θ) πeθ (p, e (θ) , θ) + [1− ρ] γe (ph, θ)πeθ (ph, e (θ) , θ)
¤ª
= 0 (146)
e¯− e (θ) ≥ 0 (147)
µ (θ) ≥ 0 (148)
µ (θ) [e¯− e (θ)] = 0. (149)
Necessary conditions for se (p, θ) are:
γeθ (p, θ) + ψ
e (p, θ)− f (θ) = 0 (150)
ψe (p, θ) ≥ 0 (151)
se (p, θ) ≥ 0 (152)
ψe (p, θ) se (p, θ) = 0 (153)





γe (p, θ) + ψm (p) ≤ 0 (154)
se (p, θ) ≥ 0 (155)





















Integration of (150) implies:
Z θ
θ
γeθ (p, z) dz =
Z θ
θ
f (z) dz −
Z θ
θ








ψe (p, z) dz − 1 = γe (p, θ)−
Z θ
θ
ψe (p, z) dz. (161)
Define:
φe (p, θ) ≡
Z θ
θ
ψe (p, z) dz − γe (p, θ) . (162)
Recall that Eq. (48) implies seθ (p, θ) < 0. Therefore, if it is optimal for any type in a given
price state to receive zero surplus it can only be θ¯. For all other types surplus is strictly
positive, so ψe (p, θ) = 0 for θ < θ. Therefore, (154), (157), and (161) imply φe (p, θ) ∈ [0, 1].
Integration of (150) for an interior type yields:
Z θ
θ
γeθ (p, z) dz =
Z θ
θ
f (z) dz −
Z θ
θ
ψe (p, z) dz (163)
γe (p, θ)− γe (p, θ) = F (θ)−
Z θ
θ
ψe (p, z) dz (164)
γe (p, θ) = F (θ)− φ (p, θ) . (165)








must optimally be zero. To see this, consider the
contrary. If both extremes receive strictly positive surplus, then ψ (p, θ) = 0 for all types.




= 0. Consequently, Eq. (161) implies
0 = 1, which is clearly a contradiction.
Since se (p, θ) > 0, the right hand side of Eq. (161) is zero for all types, therefore
γe (p, θ) = F (θ). The regularity conditions ensure satisfaction of the monotonicity condition.
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